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ARTICLE

Can the right to internal movement, residence, and
employment ground a right to immigrate?
Michael Rabinder James
Department of Political Science, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, USA
ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

This article challenges Kieran Oberman’s derivation of a right to
immigrate from the right to internal movement, residence, and
employment. His argument depends on a cantilever strategy, which
ﬁnds it illogical to recognize one right without recognizing an
analogous second right. This diﬀers from a direct argument, which
derives a right directly from an essential human interest, and an instrumental argument, which identiﬁes one right as a means to protecting
another right. The strength of a cantilever argument depends on the
direct or instrumental foundations of the initial right and the aptness of
the analogy between it and the new right that one seeks to establish.
Oberman’s argument fails on both accounts. First, his defense of the
initial right to internal movement, residence, and employment,
although portrayed as a direct argument, actually rests on inapt cantilever analogies with other rights, such as freedom of speech or
religion. Second, the overall cantilever argument for deriving the
right to immigrate fails, because immigration across ﬁscally separate
states is not analogous to movement, residence, and employment
within a single, ﬁscally uniﬁed state. Instead, a right to travel and visit
is the proper outcome of Oberman’s argument.
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Like many political theorists, I began my career by living out of a suitcase, moving from
one temporary position to another. In the span of four years, I moved from Durham,
North Carolina, where I completed my Ph.D., to Washington, DC, to Blacksburg,
Virginia, and to St. Peter, Minnesota, before ﬁnally settling down in Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania. Though personally exhausting, these moves were legally quite easy. As
an American citizen, I could travel to each new location, establish a new residence, and
work at my new job. I needed no permission from any government oﬃcials to travel to
these new places, although police oﬃcers did monitor my compliance with traﬃc laws.
Establishing a residence by signing rental contracts did sometimes require showing
identiﬁcation, and ﬁnalizing an employment contract did require proof of a legal right
to work in the USA, but these were straightforward processes. My ability to move,
reside, and work were never seriously in question, given my American citizenship. As
a result, I was able to realize my aspiration of working as a professor of political theory,
albeit after a rather circuitous route.
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Such easy movement, residence, and employment would not have been the case if
my moves had instead been from Durham North Carolina to Tangiers, Morocco,
Lima, Peru, and Lagos, Nigeria, prior to ﬁnally settling down in Pamplona, Spain.
Each move would have required me to acquire a U.S. passport and receive a work visa
from the new country, which would retain the discretion to deny my request. If one of
the countries in my sequence of jobs denied me my visa, I might have been forced to
ﬁnd a non-academic job within the USA, ending my career aspirations. This discrepancy of foreseeable outcomes grounds the contention that the right to internal
movement, residence, and employment justiﬁes a similar right to immigrate, understood as the right to external movement, residence, and employment. If citizens enjoy
the right to move within their own country in order to realize their aspirations,
foreigners should be able to move to other countries in order to realize theirs. It is
simply illogical to grant one right while denying the other.
This type of argument depends on what David Miller (2016, 15–16) calls a cantilever
strategy, according to which it would be illogical to recognize one right without recognizing
an analogous second right. Cantilever arguments diﬀer from the direct and instrumental
strategies for grounding rights. The direct strategy contends that a right directly protects an
essential human interest, while the instrumental strategy holds that a right is an instrumental means to protecting another human right, which in turn directly protects an
essential human interest. The strength of a cantilever argument depends on the direct or
instrumental foundations of the initial right and the aptness of the analogy between it and
the new right that one seeks to establish.
Importantly, a right to immigrate requires more than a cantilever extension from an
internal right to movement alone. This is because the international analogy with domestic
movement is simply a right to travel across borders and visit for a temporary period.
Immigration diﬀers from international travel and visitation by including a right to reside
indeﬁnitely in the new country, which in turn presupposes the ability to satisfy one’s basic
needs. Employment is a typical means for satisfying basic needs, but it is hardly suﬃcient.
Access to health care and, if one has children, access to elementary education will also be
required. Thus, the right to immigrate must be derived from a bundled right to internal
movement, residence, and needs satisfaction.
This type of cantilever argument has been most forcefully advanced by Kieran Oberman
and Joseph Carens. Importantly, this argument diﬀers from the question of whether the
internationally recognized right to emigrate from any country requires either a symmetrical
right to immigrate to any country or a global duty among all states to distribute the right to
entry among those seeking to exit (See Cole 2000, 43–59; Miller 2007, 208–9; Lenard 2015).
The Oberman-Carens approach simply focuses on the analogy between immigration and
domestic movement, not on the right to emigrate per se.
In this essay, I challenge Oberman’s attempt to derive a right to immigrate from
the right to internal movement, residence, and employment (hereafter abbreviated
as IMRE). I focus on Oberman for two reasons. First, Carens grounds his right to
immigrate on an analogy with a right to internal movement alone, never providing
an argument for the rights to indeﬁnite residence and needs satisfaction. Oberman
recognizes this shortcoming and defends granting all foreigners rights to indeﬁnite
residence and employment. Although basic needs satisfaction, not mere employment, provides the third leg of the proper foundation for a cantilever extension to
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a right to immigrate, Oberman clearly improves on Carens.1 Second, Carens portrays his account not as a direct imperative but as a thought experiment meant to
prod rich countries to achieve of global justice, at which point it can be put into
practice (Obermann 2013, 229, 277–8, 285). Conversely, Oberman defends the right
to immigrate as claimable in today’s world, though as a non-absolute right which,
like all other rights, can be overridden for suﬃciently strong reasons (2016, 33).
But what counts as suﬃciently strong reasons? This depends on the type of argument one
adopts to ground a right. Whereas Oberman ostensibly pursues a direct strategy for a right to
immigrate, he actually relies on a combination of the cantilever and instrumental strategies.
In Section I, I summarize Oberman’s argument, the foundations of which are scrutinized in
Section II. In Section III, I challenge the analogy between rights to IMRE and rights like those
to freedom of speech, religion, and association, while in Section IV I challenge the analogy
between the right to IMRE and the right to immigrate. In Section V, I conclude that a right to
travel and visit is a more convincing outcome from Oberman’s argument.

Oberman’s argument
For Oberman, the right to immigrate contains the right to move across the borders of
sovereign states; the right to establish residence in the new state (2016, 37); and the right to
work there (2015, 244). Bundling these three components distinguishes the right to
immigrate from the right to travel and visit, which lacks the last two elements.
Conversely, the right to immigrate does not include the right to citizenship and its
concomitant right to vote (2016, 34), nor the right to special governmental beneﬁts, such
as higher education grants or small business loans (2015, 245). Oberman defends an
ambitious right to immigrate, but without obliterating the political salience of borders.
This ambitious right to immigrate stems from “essential interests’ that ground other
human freedom rights, ‘such as the human rights to internal freedom of movement,
freedom of association, and freedom of occupational choice’ (2016, 32). But the right to
immigrate remains a moral right, not a legal right, since it is not included within international legal documents, such as the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, which
enumerates rights to marriage, religion, expression, association, movement and residence
within a state’s borders, along with the free choice of employment (2016, 33–4). His point is
that a moral right to immigrate deserves recognition, even if it remains legally uncodiﬁed.
Because the moral right to immigrate must be derived from the legal right to internal
movement, residence, and employment (IMRE), Oberman must ﬁrst demonstrate how the
latter is indispensable to essential personal and political interests. He contends that the right
to IMRE facilitates individuals’ personal interest in accessing ‘the full range of existing life
options’ regarding ‘friends, family, civic associations, expressive opportunities, religions,
jobs, and marriage partners.’ A state ban on entering a region of the country means that
‘you cannot visit friends or family, attend a religious or educational institution, express your
ideas at a meeting or cultural event, seek employment, or pursue a love aﬀair, anywhere
within that region’ (2016, 35). Such state interference is unwarranted, since it trespasses on
the ‘personal domain’ within which the individual alone should determine ‘where she lives,
with whom she lives, who her friends are, which religion she practices, which associations
1

For a critique of Carens’s argument, see Hosein (2013).
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she joins, what work she does, and how she spends her free time’ (2016, 44). The internal
right to movement also facilitates the political interest in ‘enjoying a free and eﬀective
political process.’ State restrictions on internal movement seem to undermine political
interests associated with freedom of expression, such as ‘attending a demonstration’ or ‘the
collection of reliable information.’ And because ‘one needs to move in order to meet
people,’ limits on internal movement also undermine the political aspect of ‘free association,’ along with ‘everything that free association makes possible, including political
dialogue, conﬂict resolution, and the free exchange of ideas’ (2016, 36).
Oberman emphasizes that the right to IMRE, like other freedom rights, must be
expansive, such that they grant individuals a full range of enjoyment, not merely an
adequate range. He ﬁrst notes that rights to freedom of religion, expression, and
association all deserve a full range of enjoyment. If not, ‘Judaism could be banned…
as long as an “adequate” range of religions went unrepressed. The government could
burn books in the town square…as long as there was an “adequate” range of books left
on the shelves.’ And meetings and clubs could be closed, ‘as long as an “adequate” range
of meetings and clubs remained open’ (2016, 39). Returning to the freedom of internal
movement, he suggests that if a country the size of Belgium provided an adequate range
of life options, then the USA could sub-divide itself into a series of Belgium-sized
regions and restrict people’s movement to within those regions (2016, 39). Since
presumably any of these restrictions would shock us, Oberman concludes that all
freedom rights must allow for a full, not merely adequate, range of enjoyment.
Additionally, Oberman notes that foreigners already enjoy rights to expression,
religion, marriage, association, privacy, and internal movement, but they are not
granted rights to residence (2016, 37–8) and work (2015, 244). Because the right to
immigrate includes these rights, Oberman must reject their exclusion. He does so by
citing international law’s interpretation of all human freedom rights as extensive
(granted equally to both citizens and foreigners); internally bounded (limited only by
the free choice of others); and nonabsolute (capable of being overridden by strong
justiﬁcations). So long as the right to work is internally bounded by the decisions of the
employer and employee, Oberman sees no reason why it should not also be extended to
all foreigners, absent any strong justiﬁcations to the contrary (2015, 244).
Having ostensibly defended adding an expansive and extensive right to internal
movement, residence, and employment, Oberman advocates a human freedom right
to immigrate, understood as the right to external movement, residence, and employment. Both rights equally protect personal and political interests. Just as the restriction
of internal movement to a particular region precludes my personal interest in falling in
love with someone in that region, so too do immigration restrictions prevent me from
falling in love with someone in another country. Just as the restriction on internal
movement precludes my political interest in attending a protest in another region, so
too do immigration restrictions prevent me from attending a protest in another
country. Oberman insists that these latter political interests should not be frustrated
by immigration restrictions, ‘even if we assume the traditional view that people have no
rights to political participation abroad. In order to make informed and eﬀective contributions to the political process in one’s own country, one must have the freedom to
talk to, learn from, and cooperate with people living elsewhere’ (2016, 36).
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Oberman emphasizes that realizing these essential interests requires not merely
a right to travel or visit, but a right to immigrate, reside indeﬁnitely, and work.
Because a right to visit would be temporally limited, it would still restrict the visitor’s
‘range of options…in much the same way as an entry restriction.’ Not only does
a time restriction limit the pursuit of ‘long-term projects, such as romantic relationships and employment opportunity,’ it also limits ‘short-term activities such as visiting
friends or attending a political meeting’ to within the period validated by a temporary
visa. Consequently, international visitation visas, just like domestic state permits
allowing only temporary stay in a region of a country, ‘violate the underlying interests
in personal and political freedom’ (2016, 37). And because indeﬁnite residence presupposes the right to work, Oberman concludes that ‘restrictions on employment are
eﬀectively restrictions on immigration as well’ (2015, 244). The conclusion is that the
realization of personal and political interests requires a bundled right to immigrate,
reside indeﬁnitely, and work.
As should be clear, a temporally unlimited right to immigrate, reside, and work
depends on interpreting all human freedom rights as expansive, deserving of a full
range of enjoyment. If humans have an essential interest in only an adequate range of
life options ‘large enough to award us a decent choice of occupations, associations,
religions, and so forth but nevertheless far smaller than the total number of options the
world has to oﬀer, …then the argument for a human right to immigrate collapses.
States could oﬀer this smaller range internally and no one would have an essential
interest in entering a foreign state to access additional options’ (2016, 38–9). Thus, the
idea of a right to immigrate depends upon an expansive interpretation of all human
freedom rights as requiring a full range of enjoyment.

Which type of argument is Oberman adopting?
Miller provides a helpful typology of arguments for justifying a right. A direct argument
claims that a speciﬁc right is necessary in order to fulﬁll an essential human need. An
instrumental argument justiﬁes a speciﬁc right as a means to realizing other rights, which
themselves are directly grounded. Finally, a cantilever argument contends that, if we already
recognize some existing right, it would be illogical not also to recognize the desired new
right. The direct strategy fails if the interests underlying it are not suﬃciently strong, if the
new right is not empirically feasible, or if it conﬂicts with other existing rights except in the
rarest circumstances. The instrumental strategy fails if the new right really is not the least
intrusive means to realizing the more foundational human right or if it imposes unacceptable costs. The cantilever argument fails if the analogy between the existing right and the
new right is not apt (2016, 15–22).
Overall, using the right to IMRE to derive a right to immigrate involves a cantilever
argument. But because ‘a cantilever argument is only as strong as the foundation on which it
rests’ (Carens 2013, 245), Oberman must ﬁrst defend the right to IMRE before extending it
analogously to the right to immigrate. Oberman sometimes claims that the right to IMRE
derives directly from essential human interests, but he also relies on instrumental, and
cantilever justiﬁcations. He then uses a broad cantilever strategy to extend the right to
IMRE to the right to immigrate. Oberman’s argument thus looks like this.
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P1. All humans have essential personal and political interests
P2. These essential interests must be protected by a list of human freedom rights
(e.g. freedom of speech, religion/conscience, privacy/intimacy, personal security,
association)
P3. Human freedom rights must be expansive, granting individuals a full range of
enjoyment, not merely an adequate range
P4. Human freedom rights must be extensive, granted to both citizens and
foreigners
(unlike rights owed only to citizens, such as the right to vote)
P5. Rights to internal movement, residence, and employment (IMRE) must be added
to list of human freedom rights
(Direct Argument or Instrumental Argument to realize P2)
P6. Rights to IMRE must be expansive, granting individuals a full range of enjoyment,
not merely an adequate range
(Cantilever Argument from P3)
P7. Rights to IMRE must be extensive, granted to both foreigners and citizens
(Cantilever Argument from P 4)
C. The right to immigrate (external movement, residence, employment) must be
granted to all foreigners
(Cantilever Argument from P 5–7)
Premises 1–4 are relatively uncontroversial. Philosophers of many stripes provide direct
defenses of human freedom rights, such as those regarding speech, religion, and conscience,
most of which are now embedded in domestic and international law. More controversial
are Premises 5–7, which form the core of Oberman’s understanding of the right to IMRE. It
is not always clear whether Premise 5 is directly grounded on human interests or instrumentally related to existing rights in Premise 2. Premises 6 and 7 rely on cantilever
extensions from the expansive and extensive understanding of the rights found within
Premises 3 and 4, but it is unclear whether the analogy between them and IRME is apt.
Finally, whether we can use a cantilever argument to extend IRME to the right to immigrate
will depend on the collective strength of Premises 5–7. Below, I will challenge Premises 5–7,
along with the concluding cantilever extension from IRME to the right to immigrate.

Assessing the right to internal movement, residence, and employment
(IMRE)
Let us begin with Premise 5, the argument for adding IRME to the standard set of
freedom rights. The ﬁrst question is whether the right to IMRE is directly or only
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instrumentally grounded. In an earlier article, Oberman openly adopts an instrumental
argument, stating that the right to IMRE plays ‘an essential role in securing the free
exercise of all other human freedom rights’ (2015, 244). Conversely, in a later article he
tries to derive the right to IMRE directly from the personal interest in accessing ‘the full
range of existing life options when they make important personal decisions’ and the
political interest ‘in enjoying a free and eﬀective political process.’ More precisely,
Oberman lists essential interests in freedom pertaining to expressive opportunities;
religious practice; marriage; family; friends; and civic association (2016, 35–6). He
later adds interests in an individual’s freedom to decide ‘what work she does,’ ‘where
she lives,’ and ‘with whom she lives’ (2016, 44).2
Note that essential interests are directly linked to rights to occupational choice (‘what
work she does’) and the right to residence (‘where she lives’). All the other interests are
already directly protected by other rights to freedom of expression, religion, conscience,
privacy, marriage, and association. The right to IMRE can help to realize these other
rights, but this is an instrumental argument, not a direct one. Indeed, most of
Oberman’s discussion of IMRE are instrumental in nature. To this extent, they are
compelling if they are the necessary, least intrusive, and least costly means to realizing
directly justiﬁed primary rights. Still, a direct link between essential interests and IMRE
can remain if protection of the personal domain requires the government to stay out of
decisions about where you move, where and with whom you live, and what work you
do. But to what extent must the government stay out of these decisions?
This question is crucial for Premise 6, which uses a cantilever argument to contend
that IRME must be expansive. Oberman admits that Premise 6 is indispensable, because
if an adequate ‘range of options is suﬃcient, then the argument for a human right to
immigrate collapses’ (2016, 38–9). He responds with a cantilever argument. Granting
only an adequate range of enjoyment to rights to freedom of religion, expression, and
association would allow the state to ban Judaism, so long as an adequate range of other
religious options were available; ban books, so long as an adequate range of other books
existed; and shut down public meetings and social clubs, so long as others remained. So
too granting only an adequate range of internal movement would allow the USA to
divide itself into smaller units that restrict movement across their borders.
The cantilever argument for Premise 6 stands or falls on whether there is an apt
analogy between IMRE and rights to religion, expression, and association.
Unfortunately, the analogy is not apt. This becomes clear when we examine one
framework for directly grounding rights, John Stuart Mill’s ‘harm principle,’ which
states that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a suﬃcient warrant’ (1978 [1859], 9). In
applying the harm principle, Mill is careful to distinguish between opinions, which
rarely aﬀect the lives, liberty, health, or well-being of others and enjoy a virtually
unlimited scope of liberty, versus actions, which can aﬀect others in these morally
relevant ways and thus are more prone to legitimate governmental regulation (Mill
2

Oberman never articulates an essential interest in the freedom to move for its own sake, but I suspect he would
endorse Carens’s direct argument that you ‘have a vital interest in being free, and being free to move where you
want is an important aspect of being free. It’s not everything, of course. But it matters greatly’ (2013, 249).
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1978 [1859], 53). When an action morally aﬀects only the individual actor, Mill
emphasizes that ‘the individual is not accountable to society for his actions in so far
as these concern the interests of no person but himself.’ But when ‘actions as are
prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable and may be subjected
either to social or to legal punishment if society is of the opinion that the one or the
other is requisite for its protection’ (93). So Mill’s harm principle provides operative
distinctions between opinion versus action, and between self-regarding and otherregarding actions. These two distinctions reveal crucial diﬀerences between IMRE and
other rights.
The distinction between opinion and action provide a strong defense of rights to
freedom of expression, conscience, and religion, since these primarily protect opinions,
not actions. Of course, screaming ﬁre in a crowded theater can serve as a dangerous
action, while religious beliefs could lead to actions that harm others, as in Locke’s
example of religious rituals involving infant sacriﬁce. In both of these instances, lives
and health are directly threatened. But because most manifestations of expression,
conscience, and religion pertain to opinions that do not aﬀect the lives of others, they
are clearly entitled to a full range of enjoyment. Exercising rights to marriage, association, and even privacy all involve actions, but because these are usually aﬀect the lives
and liberty of consenting adults, they deserve a nearly full range of enjoyment. Only to
the degree that these actions aﬀect the lives and well-being of others, such as children,
can the state justiﬁably regulate them. From the liberty of opinion and self-regarding
action, we have a provisional, direct argument for granting a full a range of enjoyment
to rights to expression, conscience, religion, marriage, privacy, and association. This is
why we would not allow the state to prohibit speciﬁc religions, books, or associations,
even if an adequate range of these remained available.
The problem is that the right to IMRE involves actions that directly aﬀect the lives,
liberty, health, and well-being of others in morally relevant ways. Because movement
aﬀects the personal safety and property interests of other individual agents, the state is
almost always regulating it through regulations on driving, biking, and walking, and
through property regulations that protect not only the owner (by prohibiting trespass)
but also the mover (by granting easements for passage). Traﬃc regulations also further
collective goals, such as the protection of the environment, historical landmarks,
pedestrian oriented lifestyles, or scenery. Traﬃc regulations balance the interests of
the mover against the interests of other individual agents and the community as a whole
in order to grant the mover an adequate, not full, range of movement. If a full range of
enjoyment were the standard, then many traﬃc regulations would be morally unacceptable. However, liberal democrats readily accept a plethora of coercively enforced
regulations of movement but far fewer on expression, conscience, or religion. I regularly
see on-duty police oﬃcers on the roads on which I drive, but almost never in the
church where I pray.
As the right to movement is highly regulated, so too is the right to occupational
choice. Before examining these regulations, we ﬁrst have to specify what is meant by
this right. A minimal interpretation of a right to occupational choice would state that
the government cannot choose your job or career for you, say by assigning you to a job.
A maximal interpretation would state that the government cannot prevent you from
practicing whichever occupation you prefer, wherever you prefer. The minimal
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interpretation is largely uncontroversial, but the maximal interpretation is untenable.
This is because many occupations aﬀect the lives and health of other people and are
tightly regulated by the state through licensing and educational requirements. Just
because I want to be a brain surgeon does not mean that I have a right to be one.
The state can justiﬁably prevent me from doing so if I lack the requisite qualiﬁcations.
Moreover, it is also possible that the state can prevent me practicing brain surgery in
the location where I prefer, even if I have the requisite qualiﬁcations. In rebutting the
claim that a distributively just, national health care system deprives doctors of the basic
liberty to practice wherever they prefer, Norman Daniels responds that the state can
limit the number of medical licenses granted within a speciﬁc geographical area in
order to facilitate an equitable distribution of medical providers across the entire
country (1985, 121–2). So even if I have completed my medical training and have
passed the medical board exams, the state can justiﬁably prevent me from practicing
brain surgery in my preferred location of London, if brain surgeons are in oversupply
there but lacking in Newcastle. Conversely, the state cannot prevent me from choosing
to worship in Westminster Abbey, even if there are too many Anglicans in London but
too few in Newcastle.3
This example is especially pertinent to the right to immigrate, since such state
limitations on occupational choice apply precisely to location. In order to avoid
a surplus in one location and a deﬁcit in another, the state can restrict your pursuit
of an occupation.4 Similar restrictions apply to the right to residence. Through zoning
ordinances, states substantially limit one’s choice of residence. Zoning ordinances can
directly prohibit people from living in certain locations for purposes of safety or
environmental protection, and they can indirectly do so through limits on the number
of occupants permitted per residence or prohibitions on apartment buildings. Zoning
ordinances can also preclude transient residency, not only by prohibiting hotels but also
by preventing homeowners from renting out rooms in their houses on a short-term
basis.5 Zoning laws can even regulate with whom one lives. This is controversial, but
not due to a putative right to freedom of residence, but because of potential state
infringement on the rights to privacy, family, and intimate association.6 Even Justice
Thurgood Marshall, defender of the most stringent constraints on governmental power
to regulate cohabitation, nevertheless found it uncontroversial for municipalities to
prohibit non-familial residences, such as fraternities or sororities.7

3

One might reply that the state can prevent you from worshipping in Westminster Abbey if on a given Sunday it has
already reached its occupancy limit under the ﬁre code. However, the government cannot tell me that I can never
worship in Westminster Abbey, even if I show up early to beat the crowds. Conversely, by denying me hospital
privileges in London, the government eﬀectively prevents me from ever practicing brain surgery there.
4
An anonymous reviewer suggests that Oberman would not be convinced by this argument, given his position that the
UK cannot restrict physicians from emigrating to the USA to earn more money (Obermann 2013, 447). This is true, but
only because of the fundamental right to emigrate that they enjoy not through their status as physicians but through
their status as free individuals. Once they leave the UK for the US, there is nothing in Oberman’s argument that would
prevent the US from restricting their ability to practice in California rather than Wyoming, simply by restricting the
number of licenses in the former relative to the latter. The right of the US to regulate where one practices a form of
employment through the distribution of licenses is the relevant analogy here, not the general right to emigrate which
has more to do with individual self-ownership.
5
Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
6
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, (1977).
7
See Justice Marshall’s dissent in Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, (1974), 17.
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So the right to IMRE diﬀers substantially from rights of expression, religion, conscience, privacy, marriage, and association. While the latter reﬂect limitations on the
state’s ability to regulate opinions and self-regarding actions, the former reﬂects the
state’s broader latitude in regulating morally relevant, other-regarding actions. For this
reason, we gave good reason to reject Premise 6, which provides a cantilever argument
for understanding the right to IMRE as expansive (worthy of a full range of enjoyment,
not merely an adequate range). In the end, the analogy is not apt between the right to
IMRE and the rights protecting expression, religion, association and the like.
That said, the argument thus far fails to overcome two points. First, although it
undermines Premise 6, it does not dispose of Premise 7, which holds that human
freedom rights must be extensive, or granted equally to citizens and all foreigners, not
just those with work and residence visas. Indeed, Premise 7 could survive an attack on
Premise 6 by insisting that both citizens and all foreigners must enjoy equally expansive
rights to expression, religion, association, and privacy and equally restricted rights to
IMRE. The result is that the right to immigrate becomes a right to non-discrimination
against foreigners.
In addition, Oberman could also draw on the reasoning in Premise 7 to challenge my
argument that the harm principle diﬀerentiates the right to IMRE from other rights. Recall
that Premise 7 depends on the interpretive principle that rights under international law
must be extensive, internally bounded, and non-absolute. Drawing on this reasoning,
Oberman could claim that my use of Mill’s harm principle does not diﬀerentiate between
the right to IMRE and other rights but rather provides examples of the type of ‘strong
justiﬁcation’ that states must give when intervening into any ‘nonabsolute’ right.
Let me respond to the second objection ﬁrst. Any moral right should not be easy to
override. Although Oberman might claim that a non-absolute right to IMRE can be
overridden by suﬃciently strong reasons, he never clariﬁes the type of justiﬁcation
needed to do so. This is problematic if it allows utilitarian justiﬁcations to override
moral rights. As Ronald Dworkin argued decades ago, a utilitarian calculus should not
justify overriding a moral right, even if it can justify a policy decision that restricts some
forms of individual freedom. To illustrate this distinction, Dworkin contrasts restrictions on the moral right to free speech with restrictions on driving.
Because Dworkin conceives of no plausible moral right to drive wherever, and in
whatever direction, one wishes, a utilitarian justiﬁcation is suﬃcient to restrict the
liberty to drive: ‘though the New York City government needs a justiﬁcation for
forbidding motorists to drive up Lexington Avenue, it is suﬃcient justiﬁcation…that
the gain to the many will outweigh the inconvenience of the few’ (1977, 191).
Conversely, a government cannot rely on a utilitarian justiﬁcation to restrict free
speech. Importantly, this is because freedom of speech is a moral right, not simply
because it is enshrined as a legal right within a country’s constitution. As Dworkin puts
it, ‘If citizens have a moral right to free speech, then governments would do wrong to
repeal the First Amendment that guarantees it, even if they were persuaded that the
majority would be better oﬀ if speech were curtailed’ (1977, 191).
So to override the moral right of free speech, a government must provide
a qualitatively diﬀerent type of justiﬁcation, of which Dworkin proﬀers three examples.
First the government must show that the values upheld by freedom of speech are not
really at stake in a given restriction. Second, a moral right could be overridden if its
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exercise in a speciﬁc case would abridge another right. Finally, a moral right could be
overridden if its application would impose a catastrophic, as opposed to a merely
incremental, cost to society (1977, 200).
To assert that the rights to IMRE are as equally expansive as other rights but can be
overridden by suﬃciently strong reasons leads us to a dangerously slippery slope that
allows utilitarian calculations to justify restrictions on rights, including those to freedom of speech, religion, or association. Instead, Dworkin’s concerns suggest that we
need to restrict the scope of rights to include only claims that cannot be overridden by
mere utilitarian calculations. Recognizing this point prepares us to more clearly assess
Premise 7 and the broader cantilever argument for a right to immigrate grounded in the
domestic right to IMRE. For as I shall argue in the next section, the right to immigrate
across the boundaries of ﬁscally separate states introduces utilitarian calculations that
are not present when considering the domestic right to IMRE.

Challenging the analogy between the right to internal movement,
residence, and employment and the right to immigrate
Although the right to IMRE can be directly justiﬁed as deserving adequate enjoyment,
the bulk of Oberman’s defense relies on the instrumental argument that it helps to
realize other rights. To the extent that this is the case, IMRE is justiﬁed only so far as it
is the necessary and least intrusive means to realizing other rights and does not impose
unacceptable costs on others. An obviously less intrusive and costly means for realizing
other rights is the right to internal movement alone, without the right to establish a new
residence and acquire employment. But because a right to internal movement alone will
only provide a foundation for a cantilevered right to international travel and visitation,
not a right to immigrate, Oberman rejects this option. As he puts it, an international
‘right to visit is not suﬃcient,’ since a ‘time restriction on a person’s stay restricts the
range of options available to them in much the same way as an entry restriction does.’
So if ‘I wish to meet a friend or attend a meeting on Tuesday but face deportation on
Monday, then I am denied these options, just as surely as I would have been had I been
refused entry in the ﬁrst place’ (2016, 35–7).
With this move, Oberman imposes an extravagant extension on personal freedom
rights that are otherwise uncontroversial. He surreptitiously moves from a very basic,
uncontroversial right to choose one’s own friends, to a broader but still fairly uncontroversial right to visit my friend, to an unreasonably gratuitous right to visit my friend
whenever and wherever I and my friend wish. I certainly have an essential interest in
choosing and visiting my friend, but do I really have an essential interest or a right to
visit her while she is in an important job meeting? I certainly have an essential interest
in choosing to have children and living with them during their childhood, but if they
are at a sleepover camp, can I just show up and demand the bunk under my daughter’s,
regardless of the rules of the camp? In both cases, my rights to visit friends and cohabit
with my children are subject to reasonable limitations that require only a utilitarian
justiﬁcation to be upheld. My daughter’s camp does not have to hire legal counsel to
defend itself against my demand to bunk in her room, but it might if it prevented me
from seeing her during normal visitation hours or staying with her if she were undergoing some sort of trauma.
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Perhaps Oberman would respond that although the camp can exclude me based on
their right to property, they can also consent to visitation, and the state has no right to
interfere in whatever agreement is reached between us (Cf. Oberman 2013, 445).
However, this is incorrect for precisely the reasons adumbrated at the end of the
previous section. Let’s say I signed a contract that did not grant me the right to stay
overnight with my child during her camp, under any circumstances. If I merely make
a claim that I wish to bunk under her because I miss her, the camp can override my
claim with a simple utilitarian justiﬁcation. But if my child were undergoing trauma,
I could claim that enforcing their right to property would have a catastrophic eﬀect on
my child and must be overridden. In this latter case, the state may have to adjudicate
this dispute in a way that respects the diﬀerence between rights versus other claims, and
the type of justiﬁcation appropriate to each. Consent alone does not resolve the issue.
Extending this to movement across borders, I may have an essential interest in
visiting my family or attending a conference in another country, but that does not
ground a right to move there. Rather, it is up to me to accommodate my interests
within the bounds of the visa that grants me a right to travel and visit. If my visa ends
on Monday, I should not wait until Tuesday to visit my family. Similarly, if my
conference is on a Tuesday, then it is incumbent upon me to procure a visa that will
end after the conference. Of course, this will require a duty of reasonable accommodation on the part of the country to which I wish to travel, but so long as this is the case,
the right to travel and visit suﬃces. The right to immigrate is neither necessary nor the
least intrusive means to securing the essential interests cited by Oberman.
While Oberman’s application of a right to immigrate is tenuous in the case of shortterm interests in visiting friends or attending conferences, what about ‘long-term
projects, such as romantic relationships and employment opportunities, which often
require more time than temporary visas allow’ (2016, 37). With respect to romantic
relationships, the strength of the essential interest and the type of right needed to
protect it depends greatly on their character. We can represent this on a spectrum. At
one end are very short-term romantic or sexual encounters, such as dates or one-night
stands; at the other are marriages or other long-term, committed relationships. Whereas
the right to privacy protects short-lived intimate encounters from state intrusion,
committed relationships with greater temporal extension and emotional, associational,
and ﬁnancial depth ground more extensive rights to privacy, marriage, and intimate
association. Moreover, rights to marriage and intimate association not only limit state
interference but also incur state beneﬁts, such as tax credits, visitation rights, and
privileges of conﬁdentiality within judicial proceedings, along with state enforced
obligations, such as spousal support or alimony, if the union dissolves. Applying this
to questions of immigration, it is clear that marriage or long-term committed relationships implicate greater state involvement and perhaps do ground a special right to
immigrate to committed partners. But it is hardly intuitive that individuals have a right
to immigrate simply to pursue foreign ﬂings.
The other mentioned long-term project – the pursuit of employment opportunity –
reminds us that the right to immigrate, unlike the right to travel and visit, involves not only
the right to movement across borders but also the rights to establish a residence and to work
within the new borders. But if these latter two components of the right to immigrate are
understood as instrumentally justiﬁed and open only to an adequate range of enjoyment,
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they must be weighed in a utilitarian calculus against the costs they impose on prior
residents and their collective representative, the state. Rights to expression, religion or
conscience, privacy, or association impose few costs upon others. And even if the right to
external movement alone, understood as a right to travel and visit, does impose infrastructure costs, the state can have foreigners oﬀset these costs through taxes that are both
general (tolls, gasoline taxes) and speciﬁc (hotel occupancy and airport taxes). This is not so
easily done with the rights to residence and employment.
Establishing a residence almost always involves the state provision of basic residential
infrastructure services, such as water, sewage, electricity, garbage disposal, and transportation
access. Even if the resident must pay for all or part of these services, the state itself must ﬁrst
construct and later maintain the infrastructure that allows these services to be accessed.
Moreover, if an immigrant arrives and resides with minor children, the state must also
provide them with basic education. Finally, states that provide public healthcare to all longterm residents will incur further costs. Unless we are assuming a libertarian state (and perhaps
an infrastructure-free frontier), establishing a residence will impose costs on the state and on
prior residents of the community.
A similarly libertarian set of assumptions seems to underlie Oberman’s minimalist
recognition that a right to immigrate and work, could, by increasing the labor supply,
suppress the wages of other workers (2016, 45–6). Overlooked by this framework is the
much broader array of state arrangements entangled with employment. Working an
occupation does not merely involve the employer, the employee, and other employees.
It also involves the state, in its legal-coercive, ﬁscal, and monetary functions. In terms of
legal-coercion, the state regulates employment through occupational safety and environmental regulations, minimum wage standards, rights and restrictions on union and
collective bargaining arrangements, along with the professional licensing requirements
discussed earlier. In terms of ﬁscal functions, employment is widely linked to the
provision of state pensions, while in the USA (and other countries) it is also indirectly
linked to state subventions for private health insurance. Finally, in terms of monetary
functions, note that the USA Federal Reserve Bank directs its monetary policy at the
dual goals of mitigating inﬂation while facilitating full employment. Granting all
foreigners the right to work, which may hinder full employment, may require changes
in monetary policy in response, taking us far beyond the mere supply and demand
eﬀects on labor markets. Instead, it invokes the type of utilitarian calculations more
appropriate for justifying policy decisions than adjudicating moral rights.8
But does the internal right to movement and residence not also impose such costs?
Yes, but these costs can be born more easily within a ﬁscally uniﬁed state. Oberman
claims that recognizing a universal right to immigrate would result in a world that
‘would in fact resemble the contemporary USA and the European Union, both of which
allow citizens to migrate freely from one member state to another, but also allow state
governments to reserve certain beneﬁts for their own residents’ (2015, 5). This portrait
is inaccurate. The USA is a ﬁscally and monetarily uniﬁed federal welfare state. The

8

Carens addresses concerns about the ﬁscal eﬀects of a right to immigrate by accepting waiting periods before
immigrants can access state welfare beneﬁts and by claiming states with stingy welfare provisions have fewer
grounds for restricting immigration (2013, 281). But as my examples suggest, even countries with weak welfare states
will nevertheless confront monetary policy eﬀects granting foreigners the right to work.
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European Union is a union of ﬁscally separate states, of which those in the Eurozone
share a common currency and monetary policy.
The diﬀerences between the ﬁscally uniﬁed USA and the ﬁscally disparate European
Union are clearly manifest in the budgets of their diﬀerent governing units. In 2011, the US
federal budget was €4.526 trillion, while that of California, its largest state, was roughly
€69.5 billion. In the same year, the EU budget was only €152 billion, compared to a French
budget of €928 billion.9 As this suggests, the budgetary relationships between the US
Federal government and its states is roughly inverse to that of the EU and its member
states. Moreover, roughly 60 percent of the relatively large U.S. federal budget is devoted to
welfare spending, primarily in the form of a uniﬁed pension and retirement health care
system ﬁnanced by nation-wide payroll taxes. For this reason, we can reasonably talk about
an American welfare state, stingy though it be, but we cannot reasonably talk of a uniﬁed
European welfare state. Instead, the EU is a confederation of ﬁscally distinct but internally
generous welfare states (Olsen and McCormick 2015, 15, 28, 231).
American ﬁscal union means that the right to IMRE anywhere within the USA does not
substantially aﬀect its uniﬁed ﬁscal and monetary policies. Social Security and Medicare will
receive contributions and dispense beneﬁts regardless of whether an individual moves
between jobs in Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas before ﬁnally retiring in Florida. Internal
movement, residence, and employment have little eﬀect on this system, while monetary
policy will seek to facilitate full employment and mitigate inﬂation for the whole country, not
just any speciﬁc state.
EU ﬁscal disunion, conversely, means that movement, residence, and employment can
have profound ﬁscal disruptions on member states, even those with a common monetary
policy. Take the case of Portugal. Like other Southern European countries within the
Eurozone, it has suﬀered from enormous trade and current account deﬁcits with northern
Europe, caused by relatively low productivity, the inability to devalue an independent
currency, and a common Eurozone monetary policy whose mandate omits full employment
(Pettis 2013, Chapter, 6). But unlike its neighbor Spain, Portugal has suﬀered far less
unemployment, because its citizens have been more willing to emigrate to other EU countries
with stronger economies. However, the exodus of 10 percent of its working age population
has perversely created a domestic pension crisis, since Portuguese pensions are not underwritten by richer EU countries, and Portuguese retirees cannot follow their working age
compatriots to richer EU countries and live oﬀ of their more solvent pension systems
(Krugman 2015).
Thus, recognizing a universal right to immigrate would at best create the types of
ﬁscal problems associated with free movement within the European Union.10 If so, then
the ﬁscal problems that presently result from the right to immigrate within the EU
reveals important dangers in a general right to immigrate even under the favorable
conditions found within the EU. Of course, EU ﬁscal union, with a common pension
and health system supported by EU-wide payroll and other taxes, might well solve this
9

Budget data for the EU, France, and the USA are in Sbragia and Stolﬁ (2015, 100). Budget data for California are from
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2010–11-EN/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/SummaryCharts.pdf.
10
I emphasize at best, given two caveats that Carens imposes on his argument for open borders. First, Carens contends
that open borders can only exist in a counterfactual, distributively just world with the level of inequality presently
found among EU member states. Second, Carens defends the practice of EU member states in restricting immigrants’
access to welfare and pensions (2013, 272, 281–2). In both ways, the present structure of the EU provides the analogy
for a world that recognizes a universal right to immigrate.
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problem, although legitimating this system might require a stronger EU legal and
political union as well. This would eﬀectively create the often-dreamed-of USA of
Europe, the equivalent of the USA of America. However, a ﬁscally, legally, and
politically uniﬁed USA of Europe would no longer exemplify a right to immigration
working successfully. Instead, free movement within the USA of Europe would merely
be an instance of IMRE.
Now, defenders of a right to immigrate might respond that immigrants not only
impose costs on but also confer beneﬁts to the state, since they pay various taxes, work
jobs, start businesses, and create new markets. Whether immigrants confer net beneﬁts,
which immigrants confer greater net beneﬁts, and how the net beneﬁts and costs of
immigration are distributed among immigrants and prior members of the state are
subject to an intense debate among economists, a debate I will not enter here. However,
note that the utilitarian reasoning involved in addressing these complex questions is
a good indication that we are moving beyond the domain of rights and moving into the
realm of policy, where states face lower justiﬁcatory burdens and enjoy much greater
latitude in basing their decisions on calculations of costs and beneﬁts. By blurring the
line between policy and rights, we run the risk of weakening the force of the latter,
rendering them more easily overridden by reasons far weaker than those usually
required. Indeed, accepting utilitarian abridgements to a moral right to immigrate
might allow states to comply with that right only in the case of skilled or wealthy
immigrants who provide net beneﬁts to the receiving state. Is this where defenders of
a moral right to immigrate want to end up?
So a right to immigrate, reside, and work imposes profound eﬀects on the legalcoercive, ﬁscal, and monetary functions of states. These eﬀects can be systematically
addressed by a legally, ﬁscally, and monetarily uniﬁed state, even a federally divided one
such as the USA. These eﬀects are not so easily managed across ﬁscally independent
states, even relatively equal ones like those in the EU, or those with a common
monetary policy, like the Eurozone. So whereas a right to IMRE can easily be granted,
a right to immigrate cannot. This is because recognizing IMRE as a right within
a ﬁscally uniﬁed state need not raise the types of utilitarian considerations so destructive to the concept of rights. Thus, the cantilever argument for the right to immigrate
fails, because its analogy to IMRE is not apt.

A right to travel and visit
Instead, the narrowest and least costly means for realizing primary human freedom
rights across borders is a right to travel and visitation. This right allows individuals to
visit family and friends, attend conferences and demonstrations, and participate in
dialogue and learning. The right to travel and visit is aptly analogous to the right to
internal movement alone, without the right to residence and employment. While the
right to travel and visit, either internally or externally, imposes costs upon others and
the state, these costs are smaller and easily compensated. A right to travel and visit will
impose smaller, temporally limited infrastructure costs upon the state and its taxpayers,
and it will not require the state to provide health care or educational beneﬁts. Moreover,
the visitor can defray these costs through tolls, fees, and fuel taxes paid by domestic and
international travelers, along with airport and hotel taxes paid only by the latter.
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But how should we understand the broader right to internal movement, residence,
and employment, a widely recognized legal right? Is this merely a right of citizenship,
like the right to vote? If this is the case, can legal immigrants be denied this right? Apart
from narrow exceptions based on national security, I think not. Rather, the rights to
internal movement, residence, and employment are best understood as denizen rights,
accessible only to citizens and foreigners legally within the country.
Like Carens (2013, 241–2), Oberman draws a sharp dichotomy between the human
rights accessible to foreigners versus narrow citizen rights to vote and hold oﬃce, and
both authors emphasize that international law places the right to movement on the
human rights side of the division. But international law does not grant foreigners rights
to indeﬁnite residence or to work. Descriptively, rights to indeﬁnite residence and
employment are granted not only to citizens but also to legal foreign denizens.
Normatively this third category is defensible in light of the broader ways that movement, residence and employment implicate the state’s legal, ﬁscal, and monetary
functions. Given the complexity of the functions involved, it makes sense that the
state ﬁnd ways to regulate the number of new denizens it contains, so as to ensure that
the future contributions of those denizens match up well with the legal, ﬁscal, and
monetary burdens imposed by their rights to movement, residence, and employment.
But if a bundled right to movement, residence, and employment is not a general
human right, a disentangled right to internal movement alone might be. As I have
suggested earlier, an apt analogy may exist between a more minimal right to internal
movement and a right to travel and visit across borders. Whereas a right to immigrate
must include the rights to reside and to work in a new country, the right to travel and
visit does not. If foreigners are to realize their essential interests in visiting family and
friends in other countries, then they should be allowed to travel to other countries to
do so.
Of course, the right to travel and visit is nonabsolute. This means that states can
restrict this right to the degree that they have appropriately strong justiﬁcations to
do so. But recall that the right to travel and visit, like the right to internal movement,
deserves only an adequate range of enjoyment and is largely instrumentally justiﬁed
as a means to realizing other rights. Thus, the justiﬁcations required to restrict the
secondary right to travel and visit need not be as strong as the justiﬁcations required
to restrict moral rights to freedom of speech or religion. So for instance, the
recipient state may restrict a foreigner’s right to travel and visit if it fears that the
visitor will impose ﬁnancial costs, such as healthcare, during the visit. But these
restrictions should be focused on the conditions of the individual visitor and their
ability to oﬀset foreseeable costs. While visas can justiﬁably be denied, doing so
cannot be based on blanket judgements about visitors from certain countries. If this
is the case, then blanket travel restrictions or barriers on people from poor countries
become unjustiﬁable.
Similarly unjustiﬁable are blanket travel bans on people from Muslim countries. We
can better understand why by examining the decision of the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals to block the Trump administration’s Executive Order 13780 banning visitors
from six majority Muslim countries. According to this court, the President retains the
statutory authority to suspend the entry and visitation rights of foreigners, but only
after making a ‘suﬃcient ﬁnding that the entry of these classes of people would be
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detrimental to the interests of the USA’ [State of Hawaii v. Trump (2017), 2]. The Court
vacated the Executive Order because there was ‘no suﬃcient ﬁnding…that the entry of
the excluded classes would be detrimental to the interests of the USA’ (Hawaii
v. Trump, 36). For instance, a draft report by the Department of Homeland Security
stated that citizenship was not a ‘reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity,’ while
the ﬁnal version of this report, issued days before EO 13780, noted that ‘most foreignborn…violent extremists likely radicalized several years after their entry to the USA’
(10–11). In addition, the Court noted that the Order’s use of nationality as the basis for
creating a class of individuals excluded from traveling to and visiting the USA ‘could
have the paradoxical eﬀect of barring entry by a Syrian national who has lived in
Switzerland for decades, but not a Swiss national who has immigrated to Syria during
its civil war’ (41). As a result, the travel ban ended up being not only overinclusive
(by excluding individuals unlikely to commit terrorism), but also underinclusive
(by admitting those who may be likely to do so).
Although the US Supreme Court ultimately (and I believe erroneously) upheld
a version of this Executive Order in Trump v. Hawaii 585 US (2018), I focus on the
9th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion to demonstrate the type of strong justiﬁcation that
I believe is needed to override a right to international travel and visitation. As I see it,
the state must provide real evidence that such restrictions are in place in order to
mitigate potentially catastrophic costs. That the Trump administration could not at the
time provide evidence that its travel ban was a rational means to achieving national
security speaks volumes about its mendacity and incompetence.
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